UNFRIENDLY PERSUASION: ENJOINING
RESIDENTIAL PICKETING
HAZEL A. LANDWEHR

Imagine that one pleasant Sunday afternoon, you look out
your window and see a group of twenty to fifty people picketing
on the street in front of your home. The picketers are carrying
signs that name you. Although the gathering is "peaceful," the
very presence of the crowd is threatening, prompting you to close
your windows, draw your blinds, and keep your family in the
house until the picketers leave.
Now imagine that these same picketers, in greater or lesser
numbers, re-create this same event at your home every Sunday
afternoon. What should be a day of rest spent with your family
becomes an ordeal. Your children cannot play in the yard by
themselves or in the streets with their friends. Any strange car
parked across the street or driving slowly past the house feeds
your anxiety. On Saturday night, anticipating the events to come
on Sunday, you and your family become nervous and agitated.
Because friends must traverse a gauntlet to reach your home,
they stop coming to visit. Your home has become a fortress
under siege; the only difference is that you and your family are
not the fortress's defenders but its captives.
INTRODUCTION

This hypothetical situation is much like the one that Dr.
Eduardo Aquino and his family faced in March 1988. A group of
anti-abortion activists began to picket on the residential street in
front of the Aquinos' home in suburban Corpus Christi, Texas.'
The picketers returned for four separate vigils that month, each
lasting approximately an hour and a half. Although not silent, the
picketers were peaceful and did not shout at the house, threaten

1. Response of Respondents to Application of Petitioners for Writ of Error at 5,
Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (No. D-0740). The same activists had
picketed Dr. Aquino "at his office and at a clinic where he practices." Id.
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Nevertheless,
its occupants, or trespass on the Aquinos' property.'
3
family.
the
for
traumatic
were
the incidents
The Aquinos sought and" were granted a temporary injunction
that barred the named defendants from protesting within one-half
mile of the Aquinos' home.4 The Texas Court of Appeals held
this prohibition overbroad, dissolved the .injunction,5 and remanded the case for a trial on the merits.6 The jury returned a verdict
in favor of the Aquinos and awarded them compensatory and
punitive damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.7
The trial court entered judgment against the defendants for the
amount of the jury's verdict and granted a permanent injunction
requiring the defendants "to desist and refrain from engaging in
any type of picketing within 400 [feet] of the center of the lot
upon which Plaintiffs' home is located."'
The defendants appealed the decision. The appellate court
reversed the award of damages9 but upheld the injunction as a
reasonable accommodation between the defendants' First Amendment rights and the plaintiffs' right to residential privacy.1" Rely2. Id.
3. Id. at 5-6 (noting that the doctor's wife "suffered a virtual nervous breakdown,"
and that "[o]ne child, Freddie, became reclusive, was institutionalized, and eventually had
to leave the country") (citations omitted).

4. See Valenzuela v. Aquino, 763 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (setting forth
the terms of the temporary injunction granted below).
5. Id. at 46.
6.

Response of Respondents to Application of Petitioners for Writ of Error at 6,

Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (No. D-0740).
7. Id.
8. Id. (citation omitted).
9. The jury awarded total damages of $810,000 to the Aquinos-$310,000 in actual
damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. Valenzuela v. Aquino, 800 S.W.2d 301, 307
(Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd in part, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993). The appellate court
found that these awards violated both the Federal and Texas Constitutions and reversed
this part of the trial court's judgment. Id. at 309.
It is beyond the scope of this Note to address the issues that the award and reversal of damages in Valenzuela raise. It is interesting to note, however, that defendants in
subsequent cases have argued against residential picketing injunctions by alluding to the
fact that plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law, namely, damages. See DefendantsAppellants' Brief at 12, Kaplan v. Prolife Action League, 431 S.E.2d 828 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993), appeal docketed, No. 9218SC459 (N.C. Aug. 20, 1993). Clearly, if the right to residential privacy is to have any substantive meaning, one of these theories cannot be correct.
10.

Valenzuela, 800 S.W.2d at 306. The court also rejected the defendants' argument

that the injunction violated the Equal Protection Clause because it affected only the
named defendants and therefore only the ideas they wished to express. See id. (relying on

Pickens v. Okolona Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 594 F.2d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 1979)).
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ing on the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in Frisby v. Schultz,11
the court held that the injunction was a reasonable time, place,
restriction on the defendants' First Amendment
and manner
12
rights.
More than two years after granting a writ of error in the case,
the Supreme Court of Texas decided that the Aquinos had not
13
sufficiently proven an actionable tort to support the injunction.
It therefore dissolved the injunction And remanded the case for a
new trial. 4 The court refused to consider the constitutional issues
on the ground that they were "hypothetical."15
The question of how best to balance free speech rights and
residential privacy interests is the focus of this Note. When the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Frisby in 1988, it believed that it had
struck that balance in a way that gave adequate protection to both
interests-freeing residents from the evils of picketing targeted at
their homes while allowing protestors ample freedom to exercise
their First Amendment rights. Subsequent history has proven the
Court wrong. Finding the spirit of Frisby, if not the exact letter,
easily evaded, protestors have continued to invade residents' privacy by merely extending the length of their picket lines. Ultimately, the balance struck in Frisby was no balance at all; homeowners have been forced to seek injunctive relief from the
courts.

16

In deciding to remand without resolving the constitutional
issues, the Texas Supreme Court failed to resolve two important

11.
12.
13.

487 U.S. 474 (1988).
Valenzuela, 800 S.W.2d at 304-06.
Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993).

14. Id. at 514.
15. Id. Several dissenting judges would have decided the constitutional questions in
favor of the Aquinos. See id. at 514-19 (Gonzales, J., dissenting); id. at 520-25 (Spector,
., dissenting).
16. See Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 745 F. Supp. 1082 (E.D. Pa.),
modified, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991); Boffard v.
Barnes, 591 A.2d 699 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991); Kaplan v. Prolife Action League,
431 S.E.2d 828 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 9218SC459 (N.C. Aug. 20,
1993); Dayton Women's Health Ctr. v. Enix, 589 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3033 (1992); Klebanoff v. McMonagle, 552 A.2d 677 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988); cf. Ramsey v. Edgepark, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 443, 451 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) ("Based

upon this court's reading of Frisby, any impingement beyond this narrow regulation of
time, place and manner would be an infringement upon the First Amendment rights of
those attempting to use the public streets to communicate their message to the community.").
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questions that the defendants in Valenzuela advanced in their appeal: first, that injunctions are categorically prior restraints on
speech and are therefore unconstitutional;" and second, that even
if some restrictions on free speech are permissible, Frisby defines
the outermost limits of those restrictions that are consistent with
First Amendment principles.' 8
This Note argues against both propositions. The right to residential privacy is a significant one that government may legitimately protect. Moreover, there is a judicially cognizable difference between a legitimate attempt to participate in the "marketplace of
ideas" and an attempt to physically and psychologically intimidate
someone into acquiescence with one's own beliefs under the guise
of exercising free speech rights. The First Amendment does not
constrain courts from recognizing this distinction and granting
specific, narrowly tailored injunctions barring individuals from
exercising their free speech rights in a particular way that has
been proven to harm the targeted resident's privacy interests.
Several courts in the post-Frisby era have explicitly or implicitly
acknowledged the validity of this argument in fashioning injunctions that create a picket-free area within a certain radius of the
targeted resident's home.' Such injunctions are consistent with
the requirements of the time, place, and manner doctrine, which
defines the ambit of permissible regulations on speech.
Part I discusses the central building blocks of this thesis: the
First Amendment doctrines of prior restraint and time, place, and
manner, the residential privacy right, and the U. S. Supreme
Court's decision in Frisby v. Schultz. Given these general legal
principles, Part II demonstrates that residential picketing injunctions fail to satisfy the traditional definitions of prior restraint. Part
III argues that when residential picketing injunctions are examined
under a broader definition of "focused picketing" that accounts for
picketers' intent, such injunctions can be viable time, place, and
manner regulations. Finally, from this expanded notion of focused
picketing, Part IV articulates a test, based on whether picketers

17. Petitioners' Application for Writ of Error at 26-29, Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853
S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (No. D-0740).
18. See id. at 30-31.
19. See Northeast Women's Ctr., 745 F. Supp. at 1090; Boffard, 591 A.2d at 700,
Kaplan, 431 S.E.2d at 831; Dayton Women's Health Cr., 589 N.E.2d at 127; Klebanoff,
552 A.2d at 678-81.
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have had a "fair opportunity" to communicate their message, for
determining when an injunction is appropriate to protect residential privacy.
It is important to note that anti-abortion groups are only the
most recent in a long line of protestors who have taken their
cause to the residential streets in front of the homes of private
individuals whose views or practices they oppose. Labor protestors," civil rights demonstrators,21 and gay rights activists '
have all found residential picketing a profoundly potent weapon in
the arsenal of social change. The arguments advanced here are
meant to apply with equal force to residential picketing on any
subject of social or political discourse. No matter what message
protestors seek to convey through use of the picket line, it does
not justify the repeated invasion of residential privacy.
I.

A.

RIGHTS IN THE BALANCE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The First Amendment Doctrines
Although the text of the First Amendment proclaims, "Con-

gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,"'

it is virtually undisputed that free speech rights are not absolute
and may be regulated in the interest of other important government goals in appropriate circumstances.24 The issues, therefore,
are under what circumstances government may infringe on free
speech rights and for what purposes. The prior restraint and time,
place, and manner doctrines address these questions.
1. Prior Restraint. In the realm of First Amendment doctrine, prior restraints are the most odious and least tolerable restrictions on speech.' A prior restraint is a regulation that gives

20. See, e.g., K-T Marine, Inc. v. Dockbuilders Local Union 1456, 597 A.2d 563 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990), affd, 597 A.2d 540 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
21. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125-26 (1969) (Black, J.,
concurring).
22. See, e.g., Walinsky v. Kennedy, 404 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
23.

U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).

24. Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961). See generally JOHN E.
NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW § 16.7(b), at 942-44 (4th ed.
'1991).
25. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("[A] system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.").
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public officials the power to deny a potential speaker access to a
particular forum before that speaker has uttered a word. If "the

purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail,"'
such censorship is intolerable; it stymies the search for truth by
siphoning off certain thoughts and opinions before they have had a
reasonable opportunity to be tested in the marketplace.

Despite its uniform condemnation of prior restraints, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not clarified a consistent set of criteria for
determining when a prior restraint exists.2 7 This incoherence is
particularly troublesome given that once the Court has labeled a

regulation a prior restraint, it is virtually certain to find the regulation unconstitutional."

Here, however, only two relatively

unproblematic observations about prior restraints are necessary.
The first is that prior restrairits invoke strict scrutiny.29 Although this standard is difficult to satisfy,30 not all regulations
that have some impact on free speech rights are subject to strict
26. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). The "marketplace
of ideas" terminology originated with Justice Holmes, who said, "The best test of truth is
the power of [a] thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
27. The Court has attached the prior restraint label to activities that both bear little
resemblance to true censorship and have little in common with each other. See Matin
Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1989). Professor Scordato notes that "prior restraint" has
been used to describe everything from an injunction, id. at 6 (citing, inter alia, Oklahoma
Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977) (per curiam)), to a tax on
the cost of paper and ink, id. at 7 (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592-93 (1983)), to a city's refusal to allow a touring
production of the musical Hair to appear at its municipal theater, id. at 7 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 564 (1975)).
28. Theoretically, the presumption against prior restraints can be overcome only in
very limited circumstances: publication of wartime deployments, obscenity, and "incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government." Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). In practice, however, the exceptions have not been
so limited. See Scordato, supra note 27, at 7.
29. See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70 (noting that prior restraints "bear[] a heavy
presumption against [their] constitutional validity"). Strict scrutiny requires that the regulation bear a necessary relation to a compelling government interest. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2847 (1992) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, § 14.3, at 575.
30. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §12-2, at 791-92
(2d ed. 1988) (noting limited exceptions under which restrictions on fundamental rights
may be permissible); cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (holding
that the government could use its war power to justify the internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II).
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scrutiny. The Court has upheld regulations of disruptive or harmful
conduct, even if that conduct is intended to communicate a mesregulation is not principally designed to silence
sage, as long as the
31
the message itself.
The second is that courts historically have classified injunctions as prior restraints. In the seminal case of Near v. Minnesota,32 the Supreme Court simultaneously incorporated the prior
restraint doctrine into modern -jurisprudence and characterized
injunctions as typical of regulations forbidden under the doctrine.
In Near, the Court considered an injunction issued pursuant to a
nuisance abatement statute that allowed the state to enjoin publication of any "malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper,
magazine or other periodical."'3 Under the statute, the defendant
was prosecuted for publishing a series of highly inflammatory, antiSemitic articles that accused the local government of conspiring
with organized crime.' The trial court permanently enjoined further publication of the newspaper.3 5
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
statute in effect made the issuing court a review board through
which the defendant would have to clear every subsequent publication to avoid the possibility of being held in contempt.36 "This,"
said the Court, "is the essence of censorship. 3 1 Characterizing
the history of the First Amendment as part of an "effort[] to
secure freedom from oppressive administration,"3 the Court affirmed "[t]he general principle that the constitutional guaranty of
of the press gives immunity from previous rethe liberty
39
straints.,
Since Near, the Court has struck down injunctions as prior
restraints several times.' In recognizing these precedents, how-

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Id. at 702 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 10123-1(b) (Mason 1927)).
Id. at 724 n.1 (Butler, J., dissenting).
Id. at 705.
Id. at 712-13.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 717 (footnote omitted).

39. Id. at 719.
40. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976) (striking a pre-trial
gag order enjoining publication of information about a murder on the grounds that the
plaintiff had "not demonstrated with the degree of certainty our cases on prior restraint
require" that pre-trial publicity would adversely affect his right to a fair trial); New York
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ever, one should note several important differences between the

injunctions that the Court has struck down and the type of injunctions issued in Valenzuela and the other residential picketing cases.

First, and most important, unlike the injunction in Near, which was
"not aimed at the redress of individual or private wrongs" and

could issue "upon the mere proof of publication,"4

residential

picketing injunctions specifically redress individual wrongs and

require substantial proof of actual harm.42 Second, the majority of
the Court's prior restraint cases have involved attempts to censor
the press based on the content of the proposed publication. Such

content-based restrictions on "pure speech" are quite different
from injunctions banning "expressive conduct"-such as picketing-regardless of its message.43 Lastly, the appellate court in
Valenzuela issued an injunction only after a full hearing on the

merits.' This injunction therefore did not suffer from the procedural problems that the Court has found central in other cases.45

Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (finding that the U.S.
government had failed to sustain the "heavy burden" of proving that a prior restraint was
warranted to enjoin The New York Times and The Washington Post from publishing a
classified study about government decisionmaking in Vietnam) (quoting Organization for a
Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)); see also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 396 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[E]very
member of the [New York Times] Court, tacitly or explicitly, accepted the . . .condemnation of prior restraint as presumptively unconstitutional."). But see United States v. The
Progressive, Inc. 467 F. Supp. 990, 1000 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (enjoining publication of an
article describing how to manufacture a hydrogen bomb on the grounds that the
government's proof established a likelihood of "direct, immediate and irreparable injury").
Although the Court did characterize the picketing injunction in Carroll v. President
of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), as a prior restraint, its decision to strike the
injunction was based chiefly on the lower court's failure to provide appropriate procedural
protections. Id. at 181. In failing to solicit the petitioners' input, the lower court could
not have undertaken a "balanced analysis" of the issues required in the delicate area of
First Amendment rights. Id. at 183.
41. Near, 283 U.S. at 709; see also Keefe, 402 U.S. at 418 ("Here, as in [Near], the
injunction operates, not to redress alleged private wrongs, but to suppress, on the basis of
previous publications, distribution of literature 'of any kind' in a city of 18,000.").
42. See infra subsection II(A)(1).
43. See infra subsection II(B)(1).
44. Valenzuela v. Aquino, 800 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd in part,
853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993).
45. See Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 184 (1968); see also
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 542 (1976) (noting that "no attorney for
[the] members of the press appeared" to contest the issuance of the gag order); Howard
Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 916, 935-36 (N.D. Tex. 1985)
(relying on the fact that temporary restraining order was issued ex parte in determining
that the order violated protestors' First Amendment rights), rev'd in part, 848 F.2d 544
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2. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions. If a regulation is
not a prior restraint, it still must meet the requirements of the
time, place, and manner doctrine. Under
that doctrine, a restric6
tion must satisfy four requirements:
(1) the restriction must be content-neutral. It must apply to
all messages equally;47
(2) the restriction must be narrowly tailored. A regulation
satisfies this requirement if the chosen means are "not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest;"'
(3) the restriction must serve a significant government interest. Some important interest must be at stake to justify the infringement of First Amendment rights;
(4) the restriction must leave open ample alternative channels
of communication. The speaker must have available other avenues
to disseminate her message.49
The time, place, and manner doctrine is an attempt to balance
the rights of free speech with other important goals that government may legitimately advance. It is based on a recognition that
"the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any manner that may
be desired."" ° The government may, in certain contexts, infringe
51
on free speech rights to protect other compelling interests.
Within the home, privacy is such an interest.

(5th Cir. 1988).
46. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
47. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460-63 (1980); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96
(1972).

48. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989).
49. However, the mere fact that the speaker could go elsewhere is not dispositive of
the ample alternatives element: "[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some
other place." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
50. See Heffron v. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647
(1981); see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("[T]he character of
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.").

51. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (per curiam) ("We have acknowledged that there are governmental interests sufficiently important to outweigh the possi-

bility of infringement [of First Amendment rights] ..

").
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The Right to Privacy

As previously noted, freedom of speech is important in a
democratic society because free exchange in the marketplace of
ideas enhances the search for truth. 2 Yet, if the realm of speech
and thought is indeed a marketplace, the modern marketplace is
vastly different from any that has come before. In our increasingly
global society, in which a cacophony of competing messages, opinions, and ideas vie for our allegiance, the few remaining opportu53
nities for escape-for privacy-become all the more important
The right to residential privacy implicates a right to a degree of
tranquility and well-being within one's home and within one's
community u The state can protect this right through its police
power.5
In recognizing a right to residential privacy, the Court has
drawn an important distinction between the home and the marketplace. When people venture out in the world, they are likely to
come in contact with any number of messages and ideas. They
may agree with some and be offended by others, but in no case
do they have a right to censor a message simply because they
disagree with it. Theoretically, in the marketplace of ideas, all
ideas must be heard before an individual can ascertain the truth of
any. 6 To avoid messages she does not want to consider, she carries the burden of walking away or averting her eyes.57
The home, by contrast, is "the sacred retreat to which families
repair for their privacy and their daily way of living,... the last

citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick. '58 Within this en-

52. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see supra note 26
and accompanying text.
53. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L.

REV. 193, 196 (1890) ("The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the

refining influences of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual.").

54. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949).
55. Id.; see also Carolson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 113 (1940) (noting that the
Court has recognized the "power and duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and protect the privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents").
56. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that the
purpose of First Amendment is to preserve "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate).
57. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
58. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J.,concurring).
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dave, no one is required to listen to any message she does not
want to hear, regardless of how important that idea might be in
the larger search for truth.59 This ability to control the flow of
ideas into the home is based not only on a concern for preserving
the sanctity of the home but also on a recognition that homeowners present a captive audience for speakers. Within the home,
there is not the same opportunity to walk away from unwanted
communication that exists in the marketplace. More importantly,
homeowners are not required to walk away; the state may protect
their residential privacy interests by restricting unwanted forms of
communication directed at the home.'
Solicitous of the concerns of the unwilling listener, the U.S.
Supreme Court has found a variety of intrusions to be invasive of
residential privacy. 61 These precedents, which clearly establish a
right to privacy within the home, as well as the ascendancy of that
right over the First Amendment rights of others seeking to communicate with residents, served as the basis for the Court's decision in Frisby v. Schultz.

59. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) (stating
that although restrictions on free speech "ha[ve] the effect of impeding the flow of ideas,
information, and arguments that, ideally, [the homeowner] should receive and consider,"
they are permissible).
This proposition is true even if the communication is otherwise meritorious and
deserving of consideration. See id. at 738 ("[N]o one has a right to press even 'good'
ideas on an unwilling recipient."); id. at 737 ("Nothing in the Constitution compels us to
listen to or view any unwanted communication, whatever its merit . . . ."); Kovacs, 336

U.S. at 86 (insisting that the Court has "never intimated that the visitor could insert a
foot in the door and insist on a hearing").
60. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 (1980)
("[T]he ability of government 'to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing
it [is] dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner.'") (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21)).
61. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (holding that radio
broadcast of offensive comedy monologue could be sanctioned because "in the privacy of
the home,... the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder"); Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737 (holding that a resident has the
right to request that her name be removed from a mailing list and that all future mailings cease; "[t]he ancient concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into which 'not even
the king may enter' has lost none of its vitality") (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967)); Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 89 (upholding a Trenton, New Jersey ordinance
banning sound trucks from broadcasting "loud and raucous" noises in residential neighjustiborhoods on the ground that "the need for reasonable protection in the homes ..
fies the ordinance").
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C. Frisby v. Schultz
The Supreme Court's decision in Frisby v. Schultz,62 especially its strong articulation of the residential privacy right,63 was central to the appellate court's decision in Valenzuela v. Aquino,' as
well as to the decisions of other courts that have considered res-

idential picketing injunctions since Frisby.5 The outcome in
Frisby, however, was extremely limited and, in fact, has permitted

picketers to continue to infringe on the residential privacy rights
that the Frisby Court sought to protect. 6

In Frisby, a group of abortion protestors challenged a
Brookfield, Wisconsin ordinance that banned picketing "before or
about the residence or dwelling of any individual." The plaintiffs
had been and wished to continue picketing the home of a local
gynecologist who performed abortions as part of his practice. The
picketers sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that the
ordinance violated their First Amendment rights.' In reviewing
their claims, the Court analyzed the ordinance under the time,
place, and manner doctrine.6
Building on prior decisions that allowed the state to take an
interest in protecting the sanctity of the home and the captive and

62. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
63. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
64. 800 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd in part, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.
1993).
65. See e.g., Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 745 F. Supp. 1082 (E.D.
Pa.), modified, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991);
Boffard v. Barnes, 591 A.2d 699 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991); Kaplan v. Prolife Action League, 431 S.E.2d 828 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 9218SC459 (N.C.
Aug. 20, 1993); Dayton Women's Health Ctr. v. Enix, 589 N.E.2d 121 (Ohio Ct. App.
1991); Klebanoff v. McMonagle, 552 A.2d 677 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
66. It is beyond the scope of this Note to offer more than the highlights of the
Frisby opinion. For more thorough analyses of the opinion itself, see Robert E. Rigby,
Jr., Comment, Balancing Free Speech in a Public Forum vs. Residential Privacy: Frisby v.
Schultz, 24 NEW ENG. L. REv. 889 (1990); Carolyn D. Cowan, Note, Frisby v. Schultz:
Where Do the Picketers Go Now? "We'll Just Have to Wait and See," GEO. MASON U.
L. REV., Summer 1989, at 227; Randall M. England, Note, Residential Picketing: Balancing
Freedom of Expression and the Right to Privacy, 54 Mo. L REV. 209 (1989); Todd R.
Seelman, Note, The Illusion of Residential Privacy: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and
Manner Regulation Revisited, Frisby v. Schultz, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 447 (1989); E.
Gregory Wallace, Note, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 691 (1989); Note, The Supreme
Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HARv. L REv. 143, 261-271 (1988) [hereinafter
Leading Cases].
67. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476-77 (1988).
68. Id. at 481-88.
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unwilling listener,69 the Court found the right to residential privacy to be a government interest "of the highest order in a free and
civilized society.""0 Although courts have long recognized that
picketing is antithetical to residential privacy,7' Frisby took this
analysis one step further: it found residential picketing to be inherently offensive to residential privacy.' Because "the 'evil' of targeted residential picketing, 'the very presence of an unwelcome
visitor at the home,' [was] 'created by the medium of expression
itself,' "
Brookfield could enact a complete ban on residential
picketing to promote its significant interest in residential priva74
cy.
Despite this strong language supporting the right to residential
privacy, the Court still had to ensure that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to "target[] and eliminate[] no more than the exact
source of the 'evil' it [sought] to remedy."' 5 That evil, according
to the Court, was "focused picketing., 76 It was this type of picketing that the Court presumed was intended to invade residential
privacy. On the other hand, the Court asserted that the ordinance
could not be read to prohibit "[g]eneral marching through residential neighborhoods, or even walking a route in front of an entire

69. Id. at 484-85; see supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
70. Id. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)).
71. For example, in an early labor picketing case, a state appellate court held that
picketing could be enjoined on the ground that
[t]he allowable area of economic conflict should not be extended to an invasion
of the privacy of the home. Here dwell husband and wife, parents and children,
who should enjoy immunity from the external strife of industrial dispute ....
would not aid in establishing the proper envi. . . Picketing homes ...
ronment of a home.
Pipe Machinery Co. v. De More, 76 N.E.2d 725, 727 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947), appeal dismissed, 79 N.E.2d 910 (1948).
72. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486 ("To those inside . . . the home becomes something less
than a home when and while the picketing . . . continue[s] ...
. [The] tensions and
pressures may be psychological ....
but they are not, for that reason, less inimical to
family privacy and truly domestic tranquility.") (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 478
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Wauwatosa v. King, 182 N.W.2d 530, 537
(Wis. 1971))); id, at 487 ("The offensive and disturbing nature of the form of the communication banned . . . can scarcely be questioned."); see Leading Cases, supra note 66,
at 266.
73. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 487 (quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 478 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810 (1984)).
74. Id. at 485-88.
75. Id. at 485 (citing Vincent, 466 U.S. at 808-10).
76. Id. at 483.
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block of houses"' but did not more specifically define its terms.
So construed, the ordinance was narrowly tailored and preserved
ample alternative channels of communication."
The practical limitation of the Court's distinction between
focused picketing and general marching is readily apparent in the
facts of Valenzuela v. Aquino: it has allowed picketers to continue
to invade residential privacy in the same inherently offensive way
by simply extending the length of their picket line and claiming
that they are engaged in a general march rather than a focused
picket.7 9 Taken at face value, the distinction between general
marching and focused picketing fails to recognize that picketers
can still target a particular home without standing directly in front
of it.80
Frisby, then, has done little to protect the right of privacy that
it so strongly affirmed. In fact, Frisby can be construed more
broadly to ban protests that extend beyond the frontage of a single home because its definition of focused picketing was based on
intent, not mere spatial considerations." First, however, one must
confront another argument raised in Valenzuela that Frisby did not
address, namely, whether residential picketing injunctions are unconstitutional prior restraints on expression.2

II.

PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND RESIDENTIAL PICKETING
INJUNCTIONS: A PRINCIPLED DISTINCTION

In the years since the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Near v. Minnesota' incorporated prior restraint doctrine
into twentieth century American jurisprudence and brought injunc-

77. Id.
78. Id. at 483-84.
79. See Defendants-Appellants' Brief at 8, Kaplan v. Prolife Action League, 431
S.E.2d 828 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 9218SC459 (N.C. Aug. 20, 1993);

Petitioners' Application for Writ of Error at 30, Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512
(Tex. 1993) (No. D-0740); see also Leading Cases, supra note 66, at 268; Wallace, supra
note 66, at 713-14.

80. See Leading Cases, supra note 66, at 270 (suggesting that lower courts should
expand the definition of focused picketing to include instances in which "picketers select

a particular home as a target for influence or intimidation").
81. See infra Section III(A).
82. See Petitioners' Application for Writ of Error at 26-29, Valenzuela v. Aquino,
853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (No. D-0740).
83. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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tions within the ambit of the doctrine,84 commentators have gen-

erally agreed that injunctions as a category do not belong within
that group of regulations subject to such a heavy presumption of
invalidity.'5 The premise of this Part is much more limited: courts
can make a principled distinction between residential picketing
injunctions-issued after the defendants have had at least one
opportunity to communicate their message to 'the resident and
then only on proof of actual harm86 --and other types of injunctions that in fact do stop speech before it ever occurs based only
on a speculation of harm.' This distinction can be maintained
under two different definitions of prior restraints: as distinguishable from subsequent punishments and as content-based restric-

tions on speech.
A.

PriorRestraints as Distinct from Subsequent Punishments

In his Commentaries, Blackstone offered the most influential
and frequently quoted definition of prior restraint.

84. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
85. Some argue from history, see, e.g., Jeffrey A. Smith, Prior Restraint: Original
Intentions and Modem Interpretations,28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 462 (1987) ("If the
purpose of the first amendment was to prohibit government actions against the press, the
Near decision rewrote the Constitution."); others focus on the stage at which the injunction is granted and the procedural safeguards afforded at each stage, see, e.g., Martin H.
Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70
VA. L. REv. 53, 83 (1984) ("A proper construction of the prior restraint doctrine, then,
would focus exclusively on the issue of providing a full and fair judicial hearing prior to
any abridgment."); others take the opposite approach and argue that the focus of the
doctrine on the form of injunction diverts attention from the substantive issue of what is
being enjoined. See, eg., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J.
409, 434 (1983) (suggesting that the "doctrine of prior restraint should be retired" because it "has been superseded by the expanded substantive coverage of the First Amendment"); Scordato, supra note 27, at 28, 30-31 (proposing a literal definition of prior restraint to give the doctrine substantive content).
86. Because an injunction is an extraordinary remedy, a court may not issue one
when the claimed harm sought to be enjoined is merely speculative. 11 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2948, at 370

(1973).
87. E.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that the government had failed to meet its burden in establishing that publication of an article revealing the contents of a study entitled "History of U.S. DecisionMaking Process on Viet Nam Policy" presented a threat to national security interests); cf.
United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 1000 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (enjoining publication of an article describing how to manufacture a hydrogen bomb based on
proof of irreparable harm).
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The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free state: but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon

publications, and not in freedom from censure from criminal
matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is
to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is
improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence
of his own temerity.'
Relying on this formulation of prior restraint, the U.S. Supreme
Court has made much of the distinction between prior restraints
and subsequent punishments.' One way in which injunctions
against residential picketing might be defined as prior restraints,
therefore, is if they are distinguishable from subsequent punishment schemes.
1. The Speculation of Harm. In the Supreme Court's precedents, a significant objection to prior restraints has been that they
are often based on poorly substantiated predictions of future
harms.' Unsupported fears are insufficient to overcome the
strong presumption in favor of free speech. The defendants in
Valenzuela v. Aquino9 argued on appeal that the injunction
against them was a prior restraint because it curtailed future picketing on the mere speculation that actionable harm would occur.'
88. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52.
89. The Court has said that although "a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after
publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 559 (1976); see also Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180-81
(1968) ("Ordinarily, the State's constitutionally permissible interests are adequately served
by criminal penalties imposed after freedom to speak has been so grossly abused that its
immunity is breached. The impact and consequences of subsequent punishment for such
abuse are materially different from those of prior restraint.").
Just last Term, the Supreme Court reiterated the importance of the distinction
between prior restraints and subsequent punishments. See Alexander v. United States, 113
S. Ct. 2766, 2770-73 (1993). In Alexander, the defendant, a purveyor of pornographic
materials, challenged a RICO forfeiture order entered against him as a prior restraint on
speech. Id. at 2770. The Court held that the order did not constitute a prior restraint and
that "[t]o accept petitioner's argument would virtually obliterate the distinction, solidly
grounded in our cases, between prior restraints and subsequent punishments." ld.at 2771.
90. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 569; New York Times, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 24, § 16.16, at 973 (noting that
prior restraints are predicated on the "predict[ion of] an unknowable future").
91. 800 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. CL App. 1990), rev'd in part, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993).
92. Petitioners' Application for Writ of Error at 27-28, Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853
S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (No. D-0740).
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This argument defies both the facts of the case and common

sense. The defendants asked the court to treat each individual
episode of picketing as a discrete instance of speech with no connection to past episodes and no predictive value for future ones. If
no one knows what the content of those future speech acts will be,
the defendants contended, then restrictions barring those future

speech acts before they occur are prior restraints. The First
Amendment, however, does not require courts to ignore the common-sense conclusion that picketers who have targeted a particular
residence in the past are likely to continue to do so in the future.93
Moreover, unlike prior restraints, residential picketing injunctions are based not on the fear that harm might occur but on the
fact that it already has.94 A court can issue a permanent injunc-

93. As Justice Stevens has said,
It is entirely proper, however, to draw a distinction between injunctive
relief imposing time, place, and manner restrictions upon a class of persons who
have persistently and repeatedly engaged in unlawful conduct, on the one hand,
and an injunction that constitutes a naked prior restraint against a proposed
march by a group that did not have a similar history ....
Hirsh v. City of Atlanta, 495 U.S. 927, 927 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted); see also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 390 (1972) (noting that the Court "has never held that all injunctions are impermissible"); Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287,
294-95 (1940) ("Nor can we say that it was written into the Fourteenth Amendment that
a state through its courts cannot base protection against future coercion on an inference
of the continuing threat of past misconduct.").
This problem may be particularly acute in the abortion protest cases. The conviction with which abortion protest groups hold their beliefs makes it unlikely that they will
abandon picketing until their demands are met, i.e. until the doctor stops performing
abortions. See Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 745 F. Supp. 1082, 1092 (E.D.
Pa.), modified, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1990), afj'd, 939 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991).
94. In fact, in order to grant a permanent injunction, a court must first determine
that the plaintiff has proven a substantive tort, such as invasion of privacy or private nuisance. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987) (noting
that plaintiff must show "actual success" on the merits of her case to be granted a permanent injunction); Northeast Women's Or., 745 F. Supp. at 1085 (same); see also Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 390 ("Because the [injunctive] order is based on a continuous
course of repetitive conduct, this is not a case in which the Court is asked to speculate
as to the effect . . . ."); Response of Respondents to Application of Petitioners for Writ

of Error at 5-6, Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (No. D-0740) (recounting harms visited on the Aquino family). Alexander v. United States illustrates this
point well, despite the Court's characterization of permanent injunctions as classical prior
restraints. Alexander v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2766, 2771 (1993). In drawing the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent punishments, the Court acknowledged
that the "constitutional infirmity" of prior restraint lies in the fact that no judicial determination of a constitutional or statutory violation has occurred. Id. at 2771-72. The
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tion only to a plaintiff who succeeds on the merits, which in turn
requires the plaintiff to have proved a harm to her protectible

interests.9'

Although residential picketing injunctions restrain

some forms of future speech, they do so only on the basis of a

demonstrated propensity to abuse that form of speech in a way
that harms others.' In this way, residential picketing injunctions
act as subsequent punishments for demonstrated First Amendment

abuses rather than as prior restraints.
2. Vagueness and Overbreadth Objections. Even if residential picketing injunctions are subsequent punishments rather than
prior restraints, they are not automatically constitutionally permissible. If they are overbroad,' restricting more speech than is necessary to prevent the demonstrated harm, or vague, insufficiently
specific to allow defendants to know what the injunction prohibits,
they are unconstitutional.

Properly formulated residential picketing injunctions, however,
suffer from neither of these infirmities. They are not impermissibly
vague. They prohibit only one very specific form of
speech-picketing. No legal intervention is necessary to identify

the standard by which the injunction is broken;98 ieasonable peo-

defendant, by contrast, "had a full criminal trial on the merits," id. at 2772; therefore, his
"proposed definition of the term 'prior restraint' would undermine the time-honored distinction between barring speech in the future and penalizing past speech." Id at 2773.
95. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 86, § 2942, at 370.
96. As noted previously, see supra note 9, the Valenzuela court determined that damages were not available in these circumstances. Valenzuela v. Aquino, 800 S.W.2d 301,
309 (rex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd in part, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993). An injunction is
therefore the only remedy available to redress these harms.
97. Even if injunctions are not overbroad, however, they still must be narrowly tailored. See infra Section III(B) (discussing how residential picketing injunctions can satisfy
the narrow tailoring requirement).
98. For comparison's sake, consider injunctions barring the distribution of obscene
materials. In these cases, the court typically makes an initial determination that certain
materials the distributor has already sold are obscene. It then issues an injunction barring
the distributor from selling these particular materials as well as any other obscene materials. There are two problems with such orders: first, the court has not identified the
prohibited materials that the distributor is not to sell in the future; and second, the distributor herself cannot authoritatively identify them prior to their dissemination. Left to
guess at what a court might consider to be obscene, the distributor's tendency is to err
on the side of self-censorship. Se4 e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 229
(1990); Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 (1980).
Such "standards injunctions" are both impermissibly vague and overbroad. They
have a tendency to chill speech that, if allowed to enter the marketplace, courts would
protect under the First Amendment. The difficulty in enjoining the future distribution of
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ple can understand what the injunction prohibits. 9 Nor are residential picketing injunctions overbroad." They prohibit only one
type of expressive conduct-picketing-that may be regulated in a
way that is consistent with the First Amendment.01 They are restricted to a discrete and relatively small location." ° They do not
prohibit other types of speech-for example, leafletting, door-todoor solicitation, telephone canvassing, newsletters and mailers-that have not been shown to cause harm. t 3 Nor do they
prohibit picketing itself in other locations-at the targeted
resident's place of business, at the public entranceway to her

neighborhood, even within other parts of the neighborhood it-

obscene material lies in the fact that obscenity is a legal standard; no distributor can
know what materials are obscene until a court determines that they are obscene. See
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting out the legal standard for determining
whether a particular work is legally obscene). The injunction, therefore, is impermissibly
vague because it forces distributors to guess what may or may not be prohibited under
the injunction, and, in the absence of a prior judicial determination, the distributor will
be more apt to err on the side of suppression. See Steven T. Catlett, Note, Enjoining
Obscenity as a Public Nuisance and the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 84 CoLUM. L. REV.
1616, 1626-28 (1984).
99. See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (noting that the
test of vagueness is whether conduct forbidden by statute is so undefined that persons
"of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application").
100. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967) (noting that a statute is void for
overbreadth if "it offends the constitutional principle that 'a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms'") (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
101. See infra Section II(B).
102. See Valenzuela v. Aquino, 800 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that
injunction barring defendants from picketing within 400 feet of doctor's home had a "specific and limited scope [and] allow[ed] ample alternative avenues of expression"), rev'd in
part, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993); cf. Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939
F.2d 57, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1991) (modifying lower court residential picketing injunction barring protestors from picketing within 2500 feet of doctors' homes because it was
overbroad); Valenzuela v. Aquino, 763 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (dissolving as
overbroad a temporary injunction that barred picketers from protesting within one-half
mile of the targeted doctor's home).
103. See Response of Respondents to Application of Petitioners for Writ of Error at
9, 11, Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (No. D-0740). Frisby itself
recognized the validity of this argument.
Protestors have not been barred from the residential neighborhoods. They may
They may
enter such neighborhoods, alone or in groups, even marching ....
go door-to-door to proselytize their views. They may distribute literature in this
manner ... or through the mails. They may contact residents by telephone,
short of harassment.
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (citation omitted).
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self-as long as the picketing is not physically focused on the
resident's home. For these reasons, residential picketing injunctions
are appropriate restrictions on First Amendment rights and are
consistent with residents' rights to privacy within their homes.
B. Prior Restraints as Content-Based Restrictions on Speech
One criticism of the prior restraint/subsequent punishment
dichotomy is that its temporal focus does not identify what is truly
objectionable about prior restraints, i.e., what characteristics mark
them and make them so inimical to a society that values free
speech. Not all regulations that arguably might act to chill speech
prior to its expression create prior restraints. Interestingly, the
Frisby picketers did not argue that the challenged ordinance was a
prior restraint on speech, nor did the Court analyze the ordinance
under the doctrine, even though the ordinance banned all expression prior to its occurrence. Something more than the temporal
aspect of the challenged regulation must be part of the analysis.
One appellate court, faced with the argument that a residential picketing injunction was a prior restraint on speech, characterized a prior restraint as "a content-based restriction on speech prior
to its occurrence."'" Regulations that meet these conditions
should be subject to strict scrutiny."° If, however, the challenged
regulation applies equally to all messages (thereby evidencing no
content-based hostility) and restricts only the conduct elements of
the activity (as opposed to the speech elements), a0 6"heavy presumption against its constitutional validity"'
is inappropriate."
Looking at the problem another way, constitutionally permissible time, place, and manner restrictions assume that
the conduct in question is regulable and require that the restriction
be content-neutral. If the conduct is not regulable, or if the restric104. Northeast Women's Cr., 939 F.2d at 63 (emphasis added).

105. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
106. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).

107. See Scordato, supra note 27, at 15 ("[T]here is no reason formally to disfavor
effective deterrents against speech deemed constitutionally unprotected by the courts.").
According to Professor Jeffries,

Where the speech in question is in all events guaranteed by the First Amendment, attributing that guarantee to the circumstance of prior restraint is at best
irrelevant and often misleading. The testing case is, rather, one in which speech
is concededly

. . .

outside the substantive protection of the First Amendment

but assertedly within the ban of prior restraint.
Jeffries, supra note 85, at 411.
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tion is based on hostility toward the message, the regulation cannot be a valid time, place, and manner restriction; it must be a

prior restraint.
This definition suggests two separate inquiries. The first is
whether residential picketing injunctions are content-based, i.e.,
whether they are premised on no more than the plaintiffs' and the

courts' disagreement with the content of the defendants' messages.
The second is whether residential picketing injunctions, in regulating the conduct elements of picketing, impermissibly infringe on its
speech elements.

1. Determining Whether Speech Is Protected: Pure Speech v.
Expressive Conduct. The Supreme Court has long recognized that
certain acts can communicate messages as well as, or indeed sometimes better than, words alone,"~ that "in many cases, the medium may well be the message."1 "9 However, such "symbolic

speech" or "expressive conduct," involving elements of both
speech and conduct, is qualitatively different from "pure
speech"-such as publishing a newspaper-because the conduct
element has the potential to create "substantial disorder or
inva[de] . . . the rights of others." ' °
Recognizing these dangers, the Court has approved regulations

that incidentally affect the speech component of expressive conduct
when a significant government interest is at stake."' In reviewing

108. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning of American flag at
1984 Republican National Convention); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (wearing of black arm-bands in opposition to the Vietnam War).
109. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 774 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513; see also Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363
F.2d 749, 753-54 (5th Cir. 1966); Boffard v. Barnes, 591 A.2d 699, 701 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1991) (alluding to the "disruptive potential inherent in the conduct" of residential picketing).
However, the Court has noted that some symbolic acts are so close to pure
speech-and with so little potential for disruption or danger-that they should be protected as fully as pure speech. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408-10 (flag burning); Tinker,
393 U.S. at 505-06 (wearing black arm-bands to school to protest American participation
in the Vietnam War). But cf. United States v. O'Brien 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (burning
of draft card to protest Vietnam War regulable because government has sufficient interest
in orderly administration of draft system to justify a regulation that "is an appropriately
narrow means of protecting this interest and condemns only the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its reach").
11. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 244 (1990) (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The Court has often held that when speech and nonspeech
elements 'are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important govern-
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such regulations, the Court has drawn a distinction between the
form of the speech, which may be regulable, and its content, which
is not."2 Moreover, the conduct element of expressive conduct is

subject to reasonable regulation even if such regulations incidentally infringe on the expression element.

In addition, such regula-

tions must be content-neutral, serve a substantial government interest, and infringe on First Amendment rights
no more. than is
4
necessary to further that government interest."

Picketing is just such a hybrid of speech and conduct.'

Un-

doubtedly, picketers have a message that they wish to communi-

cate. The picket line, especially when focused on the home, is a
particularly powerful way of communicating that message and has
a unique ability to induce action." 6 However, because picketing
entails the amassing of a crowd, it also carries a significant potential for harm; today's peaceable and orderly crowd could become tomorrow's angry and violent mob." The very presence of
the picket line connotes hostility,"' even when the picket itself is

mental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on
First Amendment freedoms."') (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
112. Justice Stevens formulated this distinction as follows:
[A] communication may be offensive in two different ways. Independently of
the message the speaker intends to convey, the form of his communication may
be offensive-perhaps because it is too loud or too ugly in a particular setting.
Other speeches . . .are offensive simply because the listener disagrees with the
speaker's message. The fact that the offensive form of some communication
may subject it to appropriate regulation surely does not support the conclusion
that the offensive character of an idea can justify an attempt to censor its expression.
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530. 546-48 (1980) (Stevens,
J.,concurring) (footnotes omitted); see also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 96 (1972).
113. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting O'Brien,
391 U.S. at 376-77).
114. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. This is, incidentally, the same criteria applicable to
time, place, and manner regulations. See supra subsection I(A)(2).
115. In fact, the pure speech/expressive conduct distinction arose in the Court's early
labor picketing cases. See TRIBE, supra note 30, § 12-7, at 825-26.
116. See Note, Picketing the Homes of Public Officials, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 106, 126
(1966).
117. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 33 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("The
crowd mind is never tolerant of any idea which does not conform to its herd opinion. It
does not want a tolerant effort at meeting of minds. It does not know the futility of
trying to mob an idea."); People v. Levner, 30 N.Y.S.2d 487, 493 (Magis. Ct. 1941)
("Crowds are frowned upon

. . .

because they tend to terrify the average person . .

").

118. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 498 (1988) (Stevens, J.,dissenting). Justice
Stevens's recognition of the hostility inherent in the use 'of the picket line undermines his
argument that the Brookfield ordinance would ban a fifth-grader from carrying a sign

170

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:148

conducted "peacefully.""1 9 Such potentially dangerous conduct is
not "beyond the reach of uniform and nondiscriminatory regulation,"12 although the messages sought to be communicated
thereby are protected under the First Amendment.12

Therefore,

although the messages that the picketers seek to communicate are
protected speech," the picket line itself is "inseparably something more and different."" It is this "something more"-the

reading "Get Well Charlie--Our Team Needs You" in front of the residence of a sick
classmate, id. at 496; such a beneficent display would not be a "picket." See Thomas v.
City of Indianapolis, 145 N.E. 550, 552 (Ind. 1924) ("[T]he word 'picket' is borrowed
from the nomenclature of warfare, and is strongly suggestive of a hostile attitude .. .).
119. In fact, as one court noted, "There is and can be no such thing as peaceful
picketing, any more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful
lynching. When men want to converse or persuade, .they do not organize a picket line."
Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1905).
120. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470 (1980).
121. See, eg., Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479; Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125
(1969) (Black, J., concurring) ("Speech and press are, of course to be free, so that public
matters can be discussed with impunity. But picketing and demonstrating can be regulated
like other conduct of men."); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) ("We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such
as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments
afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech."); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339
U.S. 460, 464 (1950) ("The Constitution does not demand that the element of communication in picketing prevail over the mischief furthered by its use in these situations.");
Carpenters & Joiners Union of Am. Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 725
(1942) ("[We reject the claim] that there is to be found in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment a constitutional command that peaceful picketing must be
wholly immune from regulation by the community in order to protect the general interest, that the states must be powerless to confine the use of this industrial weapon within
reasonable bounds.").
It is especially interesting to note that Justice Black, who firmly believed in a literal, absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment, see Everette E. Dennis & Donald
M. Gillmor, Hugo L. Black. "'No Law' Means 'No Law,"' in JUSTICE HUGO BLACK
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (Everette E. Dennis et al. eds., 1978), supported restrictions on picketing.
Plainly, however, no mandate in our Constitution leaves States and governmental units powerless to pass laws to protect the public from the kind of boisterous and threatening conduct [picketing] that disturbs the tranquility of spots
selected by the people . .. for homes, wherein they can escape the hurly-burly
of the outside business and political worlds ....
Gregory, 394 U.S. at 118 (Black, J., concurring); see also Cox, 379 U.S. at 578 (Black, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the First
Amendment.").
122. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479 (noting that "debate on public issues"-political speech-is
exactly the type of expression that the First Amendment was designed to protect).
123. Hughes, 339 U.S. at 464.
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conduct of picketing rather than its message-that government
may regulate in the pursuit of other valid interests.
2.

Content-Based Restrictions and the Requirement of Neutral-

ity. If the government may permissibly regulate the conduct aspects of picketing, it still must do so in a "uniform and nondiscriminatory" way. 24 Although government may impose reasonable regulations on expressive conduct even if such regulations
incidentally infringe on speech, it may not engage in censorship
under the guise of regulating conduct."
Typically, a court will find a regulation to be content-based
when the regulation provides an exemption for certain kinds of
speech." The defendants in Valenzuela relied on a counterargument: that residential picketing injunctions are content-based because they apply only to a discrete group of people and therefore
only to those messages which that group of people seeks to express. They claimed that the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the picketing because they disagreed with the picketers' views and wanted
to silence debate on a topic of public concern.' 27
It may be true, in fact, that the targeted resident disagrees
with the picketers' message; the picket line itself symbolizes that
disagreement. The harm in residential picketing, however, is not
based on the content of the message. Indeed, the targeted resident
may often face similar pickets at her place of business or elsewhere in her public life.1' The harm of residential picketing is
"the very presence of an unwelcome visitor at the home."' 29 It is

124. Carey, 447 U.S. at 470.
125. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("The essence of ... censorship is content control . . . . [Government] may not select which issues are worth

discussing or debating in public facilities.").
126.

In the context of picketing, the Court has consistently struck down regulations

that exempt certain categories of issues-typically labor disputes-from sanctions. For
example, in Mosley, the Court found a city ordinance prohibiting picketing near school
facilities during school hours except for "the peaceful picketing of any school involved in

a labor dispute," id. at 93, to violate the requirement of content-neutrality, id.- at 102.
127. Petitioners' Application for Writ of Error at 31-33, Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853
S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (No. D-0740).
128. Valenzuela v. Aquino, 800 S.W.2d 301; 305-06 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd in
part, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993).
129. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.

455, 478 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
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this physical presence-the form of communication rather than its
substance-that courts may enjoin.' 3°
That the picketers have only a single message that they wish
to advance is largely irrelevant. Once the plaintiff has shown actual harm to her privacy interests, the presence of this same group
of picketers will perpetuate the harm regardless of the message the
picketers wish to convey.13 ' Under facially content-neutral injunctions,132 therefore, the named defendants cannot communicate any message-supportive, hostile, or neutral with regard to
the plaintiff-through picketing.
III. TOWARD A NEW DEFINITION OF FOCUSED PICKETING:
RESIDENTIAL PICKETING INJUNCTIONS AS TIME,
PLACE, AND MANNER REGULATIONS

If injunctions against residential picketing are not prior restraints, they are subject to analysis under the time, place, and

manner doctrine. Time, place, and manner analysis requires the
court to balance the respective rights of the parties, giving special
emphasis to the proposition that government should not infringe

on First Amendment rights any more than is absolutely necessary.
A regulation that is "content-neutral,

. .

. narrowly tailored to

serve a significant government interest, and leave[s] open ample
alternative channels of communication"'3 is an appropriate time,
place, and manner regulation. As shown above, residential picketing injunctions are content-neutral" and protect a significant
government interest in residential privacy. 135 Based on an expanded definition of focused picketing, they satisfy the remaining
elements of time, place, and manner analysis as well.

130. See ia
131. See id.at 486 (noting that picketing "inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy"); see also Valenzuela, 800 S.W.2d at 306 (rejecting argument that contentneutral injunction offended equal protection because it applied only to named defendants).
132. See Burson v. Freeman, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 1850-51 (1992) (noting that one aspect
of the test of permissibility is whether regulation is facially content-neutral).
133. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see
also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Heffron v. International SoC'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981).
134. See supra subsection II(B)(2).
135. See supra Section I(B).
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Time, place, and manner analysis was central to the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Frisby v. Schultz.'36 In balancing the
rights of the parties in Frisby, the Court determined that the government could enact a "complete ban" on focused picketing in the
interest of protecting residential privacy. 37 Yet the Court interpreted the ordinance's prohibition of focused picketing extremely
narrowly as "picketing taking place solely in front of a particular
residence."'" The complete ban that the Court sanctioned, therefore, was far less protective of the right to residential privacy than
the Court's characterization of that right as "of the highest order
in a free and civilized society"'3 9 would indicate was appropriate.

The defendants in the post-Frisby residential picketing injunction cases argue that Frisby defines the outer boundaries of permissible regulations and that courts may impose no greater restriction on speech than that specifically found permissible in Frisby.
In fact, just the opposite is true: Frisby is not the last word on
permissible residential picketing regulations but only the first.
Under a definition of focused picketing, based on Frisby, that
looks to the picketers' intent rather than to the length of their
picket line, complete bans on picketing within several hundred feet
of a particular home are entirely appropriate time, place, and
manner regulations.
A. A BroaderDefinition of Focused Picketing
In Frisby, the Court met the requirement of narrow tailoring
by construing the anti-picketing ordinance to ban only focused
picketing."4 Such picketing could be completely banned.4' and
still meet the narrow tailoring requirement because the picketers'
physical presence itself created the regulable evil.' 42

136. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
137. Id. at 485-86.
138. Id at 483 (emphasis added).
139. ld. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
140. Id. at 486.
141. Cf. id. at 494 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that government could legitimately regulate the size, hours, or noise level of the pickets but could not prohibit all
picketing).
142. Id. at 487 (finding that "the 'evil' of targeted residential picketing, 'the very
presence of an unwelcome visitor at the home,' [was] 'created by the medium of expression itself' ") (citations omitted).
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The central issue in post-Frisby injunction cases such as
Valenzuela v. Aquino143 is whether focused picketing is only
"picketing taking place solely in front of a particular residence"1 " or whether the Frisby definition is only one of several
that could describe focused picketing. The defendants claim that
because their picket lines move up and down the street, often in
front of an entire block or more of houses, they are engaging not
in prohibited focused picketing but in general marching, which
Frisby expressly permitted. 45
This argument is problematic because it focuses only on one
specific example of a more general definition of focused picketing.
The Court in fact defined focused picketing in more general terms
as picketing that was designed not to "disseminate a message to
the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and
to do so in an especially offensive way." 146 The "type of focused
picketing"147 that the Frisby ordinance banned-picketing taking
place solely in front of a single residence-was an example of such
intrusive behavior, but it is not the only possible example. It is
possible, in fact, to imagine that other forms of picketing that do
not involve standing stationary in front of a single home nevertheless could be targeted to. intrude on the residents of that home.
For these picketers return not to random or varied places throughout the city or even to different areas of a single neighborhood, as
those seeking the widest possible audience for reception of their
message would, but to the same location time and time again. The
signs name a particular individual; ¢ sometimes the picket line
slows down as it passes in front of that particular individual's
home;149 the defendants in Valenzuela even carried out surveillance of the plaintiffs' home with binoculars and a video camera. 5° This is focused picketing, as offensive and intrusive as that

143. 800 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd in part, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993).
144. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482.
145. Petitioners' Application for Writ of Error at 30-31, Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853
S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (No. D-0740).
146. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Valenzuela v. Aquino, 800 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd in part,
853 S.W.2d 512 (rex. 1993).
149. See Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 3, Kaplan v. Prolife Action League, 431 S.E.2d
828 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 9218SC459 (N.C. Aug. 20, 1993).
150. Response of Respondents to Application of Petitioners for Writ of Error at 5,
Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (No D-0740).
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identified in Frisby and equally subject to regulation by a complete
ban broad enough to remove the source of the offense.'5 '
A broader ban than the one the Court specifically approved
in Frisby also may be appropriate given the Frisby Court's recognition that focused picketing was impermissibly destructive of the
environment thought appropriate to the home.' 2 Some courts
have justified residential picketing injunctions on an interpretation
of Frisby that accounts for the special nature of the home.5
Such an approach is premised on the idea that "[t]he nature of a
place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of
regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable.' ,,1s4
Under this approach, the definition of what constitutes focused
picketing expands to include not only picketing located physically
in front of a single home but also picketing of a broader geographic scope that nonetheless is directed at a single home. This
approach takes the underlying rationale of Frisby-that focused
residential picketing is inherently offensive'---to its logical conclusion. If the evil of such behavior lies in singling out a particular
individual, that evil exists whenever the purpose of the picket is to
focus pressure on an individual in her home, regardless of the
amount of space used to accomplish that goal.
It is the intent of the picketers, not the distance the picket
line travels, that defines focused picketing. The logic of Frisby,
with its focus on the sanctity of the home and the activities appropriate to it, suggests that a broader definition of focused picketing
is warranted. If focused picketing is more broadly defined, courts
may ban it whenever picketers use the residential forum to intrude
on residential privacy rather than to disseminate a message to the
general public.

151. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485-88.
152. Id. at 484, 486-87.
153. Se4 eg., Valerzuela v. Aquino, 800 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (noting

that "[t]he home should be a sanctuary insulated from as many external pressures as possible"), rev'd in part, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993).
154. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (quoting Charles A.
Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND.L. REV. 1027, 1042 (1969)) (footnote
omitted).

155. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486.
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B. Narrow Tailoring
Even if a significant government interest in protecting privacy
justifies regulation of focused picketing, a regulation cannot restrict
more speech than is necessary to protect that interest.5 6 A proposed regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve the significant
government interest that justifies the regulation. This requirement
does not demand that the regulation be the least restrictive means
of accomplishing the government's goals, in the sense that no
other imaginable alternative exists that is less burdensome on
speech; it means only that the chosen restriction is "not substantially 7broader than necessary to achieve the government's inter15
est.

To be valid, a residential picketing injunction could not be so
broad that it swept within its ambit both focused picketing meant
to intrude on residential privacy and other types of protests that
have a truly communicative purpose and intent. Although courts
have been rightfully hesitant to create injunctions that could effectively encompass an entire neighborhood,
protected areas of
several hundred feet around the targeted residence are entirely
consistent with the requirement of narrow tailoring because they
do no more than eliminate a proven harm. As a facial challenge,
Frisby only offered the building blocks; courts themselves must
fashion appropriate injunctions based on proven harms to residential privacy.

156. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
157. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989). The least restrictive
means test has been criticized as too subjective and subject to manipulation. See Illinois
State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 188-89 (1979) (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (stating that any creative judge could always devise some less drastic alternative); William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court: Tie
Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
757, 792-99 (1986).

158. See Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939 F.2d 57, 66-67 & n.14 (3d
Cir. 1991) (finding lower court's injunction creating a 2500-foot protected zone around the
targeted residence of doubtful constitutionality given Frisby's single residence language
and modifying the injunction to ban picketing within 500 feet of the doctor's residence,
although leaving open the possibility that, on proof of extraordinary circumstances, the
2500-foot ban would be appropriate); Valenzuela v. Aquino, 763 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988) (dissolving temporary injunction creating a picket-free zone of one-half mile

around plaintiffs' residence).
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C. Ample Alternative Channels

Finally, a valid time, place, and manner regulation must pre-

serve ample alternative channels of communication. 59 The re-

quirement of ample alternative channels is linked to the requirement of narrow tailoring and ensures that in closing off one fo-

rum, the government does not strangle speech entirely. Other opportunities to communicate the message must remain intact.

In Frisby, the Court found that the challenged ordinance,
narrowly construed to ban only focused picketing, preserved ample
alternative channels because it could not be read to prohibit

"[g]eneral marching through residential neighborhoods, or...
walking a route in front of an entire block of houses."'

6

Be-

cause their picket line extended beyond the property lines of a
single home, the defendants in Valenzuela characterized their behavior as general marching and claimed that an injunction prohibiting such marching failed to preserve ample alternative channels
of communication.'61
Yet, as already noted, 62 the distinction between focused
picketing and general marching is based on intent, not on the
mere physical parameters of the picket line. 6 3 There is no right

159. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
160. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988).
161. Petitioners' Application for Writ of Error at 30, Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853
S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (No. D-0740).
162. See supra Section II(A).
163. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486 ("The type of picketers banned by the Brookfield ordinance generally do not seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way.").
The Supreme Court's decision in Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969),
does not undermine this assertion. Gregory, which involved a civil rights demonstration, is
distinguishable from Valenzuela and the other recent residential picketing cases on several
grounds. First, the march in Gregory covered a five-mile route that began at the Chicago
Loop District and culminated in the mayor's neighborhood. Id. at 115 (Black, J., concurring). Such a demonstration is much more akin to a general march, intended to generate
publicity, than to focused picketing that merely travels one or two blocks on either side
of a targeted residence, intended to physically intimidate the targeted resident. Second,
Gregory involved the picketing of a public official's home. Id. The Valenzuela appellate
court recognized that the plaintiffs there were not public officials and therefore had a
reasonable expectation of privacy within their home. Valenzuela v. Aquino, 800 S.W.2d
301, 307 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd in part, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993); see also
Walinsky v. Kennedy, 404 N.Y.S.2d 491, 497 (Sup. Ct. 1977). Lastly, the protestors in
Gregory had not been shown to have been responsible for any actionable harm; it was
the crowd of spectators who caused the melee that resulted in the protestors arrest. Gregory, 394 U.S. at 128-29 (Black, J., appendix to concurring opinion) (quoting Chicago v.
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to engage in focused picketing no matter how far the picket line

travels. Residential picketing injunctions, therefore, may satisfy the
ample alternative channels requirement as long as they maintain
other opportunities for communication that do not involve the
invasion of residential privacy.
Residential picketing injunctions ban a single form of behavior-picketing-in a discrete and well-defined area. They do not
prevent picketing at other locations, e.g., the resident's place of
business, 164 the entrance to her neighborhood, or other public

Gregory, 233 N.E.2d 422, 424-26 (Ill.
1968)). The picketers in Valenzuela and similar resideritial picketing cases are not so blameless. See supra note 94.
164. Valenzuela, 800 S.W.2d at 306. Some lower courts have granted residential picketing injunctions on the grounds that the targeted resident's business, and not the home, is
the true situs of the dispute. See, e.g., K-T Marine v. Dockbuilders Local Union 1456,
597 A.2d 540, 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (upholding the lower court's ability
to enjoin picketing at a company president's home on the grounds that it was "a neutral
dwelling having no connection with the labor controversy"); Town of Barrington v. Blake,
568 A.2d 1015, 1021 (R.I. 1990) (construing a town ordinance as meeting the ample alternatives requirement on the grounds that, inter alia, "picketers are also provided the opportunity to picket at a place of business, which is generally a more effective forum to
disseminate their views, unless the picketers' objective is only to harass or intimidate an
individual").
The idea that picketing could be restricted to the situs of the dispute is not a new
one. See Carpenter's & Joiners Union of Am. Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S.
722 (1942). In Ritter's Cafe, striking workers picketed the respondent's business after he
entered into a construction contract with a general contractor who did not hire union
labor for the job. The construction contract was otherwise unrelated to the respondent's
restaurant business. Id. at 722-23. In upholding the lower court's decision to enjoin the
pickets, the Supreme Court held that
recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech does not imply
that the states must be without power to confine the sphere of communication
to that directly related to the dispute. Restriction of picketing to the area of
the industry within which a labor dispute arises leaves open to the disputants
other traditional modes of communication. To deny to the states the power to
draw this line is to write into the Constitution the notion that every instance of
peaceful picketing-anywhere and under any circumstances-is necessarily a
phase of the controversy which provoked the picketing.
Id.at 727-28. The Court said that due process did not require the states to tolerate
"conscription of neutrals." Id. at 728.
Moreover, such an argument is implicit in then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Carey
v. Brown, on which the Court relied in formulating its opinion in Frisby. See Frisby, 487
U.S. at 486-87 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 478-79 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting)). In Carey, the Court struck down as a content-based restriction an ordinance
that banned residential picketing except when the residence also was used as a place of
business. Carey, 447 U.S. at 457. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist insisted, "Our cases clearly
support a State's authority to design the permissibility of picketing in relation to the use
to which a particular building is put," id. at 482 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and chastised
the Court for putting such substantial obstacles in the path of state efforts to protect residential privacy: "it is not for us to supervise the limits the legislature may impose in
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places she frequents. Nor do they prohibit other forms of commu-

mailings, that
nication, e.g., leafletting, door-to-door solicitation, or
16 5
have not been shown to invade residential privacy.

Defendants may counter that these forms of expression deprive them of the best forum in which to disseminate their message,"66 but this argument only reveals their true intent. If the

picketers' aim were solely to communicate a message, surely some
or all of the alternate means suggested above could serve that goal

equally well. 67 The real benefit of residential picketing, by contrast, is its ability to create a highly offensive invasion of privacy
and thereby to hasten compliance with the picketers' demands."6
Because

"[t]he

picket line elicits conditioned respons-

es"-principally anxiety and fear-"the picket signs might just as
effectively be blank."'"

safeguarding the steadily narrowing opportunities for serenity and reflection." Id. at 489
(quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). In comparison, in cases in which picketing has occurred at the plaintiff's place of business,
courts have struck down injunctions as prior restraints. See, e.g., In re Stonegate Security
Servs., Ltd., 56 B.1L 1014, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (noting "the lack of any showing of a
damaging impact on a compelling, countervailing interest").
165. This is not to say that such practices might not, if abused, become an enjoinable
source of harm. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)
(holding that the state could protect residential privacy by allowing residents to refuse
unwanted mailings); see also Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 745 F. Supp.
1082, 1090 (E.D. Pa.) (injunction keeping picketers away from entrance to abortion clinic
justified on basis of proven harm to patients), modified, 749 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa.
1990), affd, 939 F. 2d 57 (3d Cir. 1991).
166. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486 ("[E]ven if some such picketers have a broader communicative purpose, their activity nonetheless inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy.").
In addition, one must remember that although the residential street in front of the
targeted home may be the best forum for picketers to communicate their message, it is
the only forum in which residents can create a private home environment. See Klebanoff
v. McMonagle, 552 A.2d 677, 682 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
167. See Barrington, 568 A.2d at 1021 ("[P]icketers are also provided the opportunity
to picket at a place of business, which is generally a more effective forum to disseminate
their views, unless the picketers' objective is only to harass or intimidate an individual.").
168. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (finding that "the very presence of a picket line may induce
action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are
being disseminated"); see also Carey, 447 U.S. at 485 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Harassment] is not the type of influence that a democratic society has traditionally held high
as a part of the Bill of Rights.").
169. Alfred Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 N.W. U. L.
REV. 177, 198, 199 (1966).
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Residential picketing injunctions leave open ample alternative
channels of communication because they bar only those forms of
expression that have been shown to cause harm when practiced in
a particular place. Although it is true that "one is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriateplaces abridged
on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place,"'70 the
place chosen must in fact be appropriate."' Although picketing
is undoubtedly appropriate in other places, the home simply is not
an appropriate place for this particular form of expression. Residential picketing is "merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like
a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."'" As such, courts
may enjoin residential picketing consistent with the ample alternative channels requirement.
IV.

STRIKING A

NEW BALANCE: THE FAIR OPPORTUNITY TEST

In granting a permanent injunction, a court undertakes a
balancing analysis to determine, based on the particular facts of
each case, the appropriate content and scope of the injunction.1"
In residential picketing cases, two very important rights-free
speech and residential privacy-clash. When expressive conduct has
not yet taken place, harms to privacy interests are speculative,
and, absent exceptional circumstances, the court may not impose a
prior restraint on that conduct. 74 The first instance of residential
picketing, however, creates an invasion of privacy. 75 If the picketing is repeated, injuries to privacy interests begin to accumulate.

170. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (emphasis added).
171. See Note, supra note 116, at 137 ("The number of picketers, the time of day, the
intensity of traffic, and other variables of time and manner do not alter the character of
the private residence as unsuitable for protest activity."). But cf. Daniel M. Taubman,
Comment, Picketers at the Doorstep, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 95, 105 (1974) ("Certainly, the content of the message sought to be delivered need not be at all related to
the site of its reception.").
172. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (quoting Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
173. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380, 1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that
if plaintiff has succeeded on the merits of her case, "the Court must then decide whether
the 'balance of the equities' favor [sic] injunctive relief, and if so, what form it should
take."), rev'd on other grounds, 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 817
(1987).
174. See supra subsection ll(A)(1).
175. See Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 469 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Once privacy is invaded, privacy is gone.").
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At some point, the balance between free speech and residential
privacy begins to tip in favor of privacy; at this point, courts may
enjoin picketing to protect privacy.
The question, then, is at what point the balance is tipped.
Under the intent-centered definition of focused picketing suggested
above, the balance must tip when the purpose to communicate a
message becomes subsumed by the purpose simply to invade residential privacy for the sake of the invasion. Courts are justified in
drawing a distinction between communication and physical and
psychological intimidation, between free speech and harassment.176 Drawing this distinction does not infer that the message
is no longer valuable but only that the conduct has become so
harmful that courts may enjoin it despite incidental effects on the
message. Courts can draw this line based on a determination of
whether the picketers have had a "fair opportunity" to communicate their message. 7
A.

The Distinction Between Communication and Harassment

The evil identified in Frisby is that of physically intruding on
residential privacy simply to create a psychological harm rather
than to disseminate a message.' If this is the case, then residential picketing, peaceful or otherwise, should be enjoinable wherever
it is pursued more for its intrusive than for its communicative effects.

9

Dissenting in Frisby, Justice Brennan took special exception to
the Court's formulation of a test based on the speaker's intent to
coerce. He insisted that the Court's precedents clearly indicated
that an intent to coerce the listener does not remove a speech act
from the realm of the First Amendment; s as long as picketing
176. See, e.g., Franklin Chalfont Assocs. v. Kalikow, 573 A.2d 550, 556 (Pa. Super. Ct.

1990) (finding an injunction against picketing that was not shown to be "physically intimidating" to be an unconstitutional prior restraint).
177. This proposed test is intended to inform the application of the time, place, -and
manner analysis, not to replace it. It also ensures that residential picketing injunctions do
not run afoul of the prior restraint doctrine, since residents must demonstrate an actual
harm before courts may issue injunctions under the test.
178. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988); id. at 498 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. 1d. at 486 (stating that "even if some such picketers have a broader communicative purpose, their activity nonetheless inherently and offensively intrudes on residential
privacy").
180. Id. at 495 (Brennan, ., dissenting) (citing Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)). American courts have recognized this principle only

182
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is peaceful, argued Justice Brennan, its goal is "not fundamentally
different from the function of a newspaper.""1 '
There are two problems with this argument. First, it ignores
the important distinction between pure speech, such as publishing
a newspaper, and expressive conduct, such as picketing, which
government may regulate to protect residential privacy.18 2
Although a state is powerless to regulate a newspaper editorial
that might be offensive, if the paper subsequently began sending
out voluminous mailings expounding its offensive position,1" or
broadcasting the offensive message over the radio," or renting a
sound truck to blare the offensive message throughout residential
neighborhoods,1" the courts surely could remedy such behavior
under the Court's precedents.
Second, Justice Brennan's choice of the word "coercion" to
describe a permissible goal of communication and a protectible
First Amendment interest is problematic. This reasoning ignores an
important distinction between persuasion, which focuses on the
message alone, and physical and psychological intimidation, in
which the speaker resorts to a highly coercive form of conduct as

a vehicle for her message. Even peaceful picketing, especially
when repeated and especially when taking place at the home, is
not merely persuasive in the same sense as a newspaper editorial
is persuasive;" at some point, the conduct itself becomes physi-

fairly recently. Through the 1960s, courts routinely offered relief to residents from picketing at their homes on the grounds that the picketers' motivation was coercive rather than
informational. See, eg., Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950); Hall v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 72 F. Supp. 533, 537 (D. Haw. 1947); State v. Zanker, 229 N.W.
311, 311-12 (Minn. 1930); Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, 199 A. 598, 604 (NJ. 1938); Walinsky v. Kennedy, 404 N.Y.S.2d 491, 497
(Sup. Ct. 1977); Hebrew Home & Hosp. for Chronic Sick, Inc. v. Davis, 235 N.Y.S.2d
318, 323-24 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Pipe Machinery Co. v. De More, 76 N.E.2d 725, 726 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1947).
181. Keefe, 402 U.S. at 419 (citation omitted).
182. See supra subsection II(B)(1).
183. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1972) (allowing
homeowners to refuse unwanted mailings).
184. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (allowing states to prohibit
offensive broadcasts on grounds that such broadcasts intrude on residential privacy).
185. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87-89 (1949) (upholding town ordinance banning
the use of sound trucks in residential neighborhoods).
186. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 485 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Harassment] is not the type of influence that a democratic society has traditionally held high
as a part of the Bill of Rights."); Kamin, supra note 169, at 231 ("If public decisions are
to be made in this way, the group which can bring the greatest amount of physical pow-
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cally and psychologically intimidating, regardless of the mes-"
sage. 187 The point at which picketing to communicate a message

begins to tip over into harassment solely for harassment's
sake-even if ostensibly peacefult--is the point at which courts
may enjoin it.
B.

Tipping the Balance: The Fair Opportunity Test
If courts may draw a permissible distinction between an intent

to persuade and an intent to physically and psychologically intimidate in deciding whether or not to grant a residential picketing

injunction, they must have some basis on which to draw this distinction. The standard for granting an injunction requires courts to
balance the competing rights of free speech and residential privacy
by weighing the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted
against the harm to the plaintiff if it is denied. This Section suggests that one possible way to balance these harms is to determine
whether the picketers have had a "fair opportunity" to communicate their message to the targeted resident.'8 9
er to bear upon officials will see its views prevail. A government somewhere might function this way-but it would not be a democracy."); see also Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1905) ("When men want to converse or persuade,
they do not organize a picket line."); Bering v.SHARE, 721 P.2d 918, 928 (Wash. 1986)
(en bane) (finding that the heightened "coercive impact" of having to confront abortion
protestors when entering a clinic threatens the rights of women to choose to have legal
abortions and the rights of doctors to choose to perform them), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S.
1050 (1987).
187. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (noting that the goal of the residential picketer is not to communicate with the general public but to invade residential
privacy).
188. See Atchinson, 139 F. at 584 ("There is and can be no such thing as peaceful
picketing, any more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful
lynching."); Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775
(1942) ("A state is not required to tolerate in all places and all circumstances even
peaceful picketing by an individual.").
189. Justice Stevens suggested such a theory in his dissenting opinion in Frisby.
I do not believe that picketing for the sole purpose of imposing psychological
harm on a family in the shelter of their home is constitutionally protected. I do
believe, however, that the picketers have a right to communicate their strong
opposition to abortion to the doctor, but after they have had a fair opportunity
to communicate that message, I see little justification for allowing them to remain in front of his home and repeat it over and over again simply to harm
the doctor and his family.
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 498 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v.
Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 N.W. U. L. REV. 153, 193 (1972)
(suggesting that speakers be given at least "one shot" at an audience before the law may
protect the audience's right to escape the communication).
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*The definition of fair opportunity is a fact-specific one designed to protect protestors' right to communicate their message.
This definition explicitly recognizes, however, that once picketers
have had such an opportunity to communicate, the importance of
picketing .as a vehicle for disseminating the message begins to
wane. With each additional instance, the conduct becomes more
and more an end in itself. At some point, therefore, courts are
justified in determining that the desire to "intrude on the targeted
19
resident""
has eclipsed any "broader communicative
91
purpose"' that the picketers still may possess.
The most salient factor that courts should consider in determining whether picketers have received a fair opportunity to communicate their message is repetition. The fair opportunity theory
assumes that repetition is evidence of a purpose to physically and
psychologically intimidate and that with each repeated incident of
residential picketing, communicative goals become less important
than coercive ones. In some circumstances, however, a single incidence of residential picketing, coupled with an expressed intent to
return, may be sufficient to trigger a court's protection. 192 More
frequently, the picketing will have occurred numerous times over a
period of weeks,193 months, 94 or even more than a year 9S

before the resident seeks to enjoin it. In such circumstances, the
burden may shift to the picketer to show that her conduct is not
intended to physically and psychologically intimidate.
Once the presumption of an intent to intimidate is raised,
other factors may strengthen or weaken it. Such factors could
include the size of the crowd, the duration of the picket, the
amount of time between pickets, whether the protestors have
picketed the resident before in other locations, the demonstrated
level of harm to the resident and her family, and the picketers'
demonstrated good faith in attempting to communicate with the
particular resident.1" This list is certainly not exclusive; it is
190. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486.
191. Id.
192. See Walinsky v. Kennedy, 404 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1977).

193. See Response of Respondents to Application of Petitioners for Writ of Error at
5, Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1993) (No. D-0740).
194. See Klebanoff v. McMonagle, 552 A.2d 677, 677 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).

195. See Plaintiffs-Appellees' Brief at 2, Kaplan v. Prolife Action League, 431 S.E.2d
828 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), appeal docketed, No. 9218SC459 (N.C. Aug. 20, 1993).

19.

Thus, for example, picketers who purposely chose to picket during those times of

day when the targeted resident was at work but her spouse and/or children were at home
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meant only to be suggestive of those factors that could indicate

that picketers have had a fair opportunity to communicate their
message and that picketing is no longer being pursued principally
to communicate.
It is interesting to note that in some respects the fair opportu-

nity model is less restrictive of speech than the ordinance upheld
in Frisby. The fair opportunity model gives protestors an opportu-

nity to use the residential forum, even for focused picketing, for as
long as it takes to accomplish the valid purpose of communicating

a message. The ordinance approved in Frisby, by contrast, completely prohibited focused picketing before it ever occurred. More-

over, the fair opportunity model does not go beyond the limits of
other important residential privacy decisions. For example, in FCC
9 and Kovacs v. Cooper,'
v. Pacifica Foundation"

the Court

did not require the resident to absorb even the initial impact of
speech before her privacy could be protected;' 99 within the home,

the resident's right to avoid unwanted speech was found to be
superior to any and all attempts to communicate with her.'

The fair opportunity theory, then, is a way of framing the
issue of how courts can balance the rights of free speech and
privacy in deciding whether or not to grant a residential picketing
injunction. It says that courts can strike this balance based on a
demonstrated intent primarily to physically and psychologically

could not complain that they had not received a fair opportunity to communicate to the
targeted resident.
197. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
198. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
199. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748-49 ("To say that one may avoid further offense
by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy
for an assault is to run away after the first blow."); id. at 759 (Powell, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("Although the First Amendment may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of offensive but protected speech when they are in
public . . .a different order of values obtains in the home.") (citations omitted); Kovacs,
336 U.S. at 86-87 (noting that sound truck regulation, unlike those forbidding the distribution of handbills, was permissible because it regulated an intrusion that the resident
could not avoid by refusing to accept the proffered communication).
200. In fact, the fair opportunity model is more akin to the regulation upheld in
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). In Rowan, the Court
required mailers who wished to communicate with residents to cease on request of the
addressee. ld. at 737. By the same token, the fair opportunity theory also requires an
affirmative act of the resident-the seeking of a court-ordered injunction-to invoke the
privacy protections. Indeed, in comparison to Rowan, the fair opportunity model for residential picketing injunctions puts a far heavier burden, both motivational and financial, on
the homeowner to protect her privacy interests.
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intimidate rather than to communicate. 20 ' This intent may be inferred from a number of factors that go to prove that the conduct
has become an end in itself rather than a means to the end of
expressing an opinion. The fair opportunity theory does not say
that the picketers' message is, at some point, no longer valuable in
the marketplace of ideas; it suggests only that the conduct of picketing can become so invasive that it can no longer be tolerated
despite the value of the message sought to be communicated thereby.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Note has argued for a new balance between free speech
and residential privacy in the residential picketing injunction cases.
As the post-Frisby cases demonstrate, the balance struck in Frisby
is not working-at least not for residents. In attempting to strike a
new balance, courts are justified in granting injunctions barring
defendants from picketing within several hundred feet of a particular home because these courts are working with facts
that the
22
Supreme Court did not have available to it in Frisby. 0
These facts show several things. They show that the picketing
has created an actual harm to the resident's privacy interest. The
existence of this real harm takes the injunctions out of the realm
of prior restraint and puts them within the realm of subsequent
punishments for harms already committed. Proof of harm also
allows courts to fashion content-neutral regulations on picketing as
conduct: it is the picketing itself that creates the harm that courts
may enjoin, regardless of the message sought to be communicated
thereby. Moreover, the evidence in the post-Frisby residential
picketing injunction cases proves that focused picketing can consist
of more than simply standing in front of a single residence, for the
Frisby Court's definition of focused picketing was based on the
picketers' intent, not merely on the physical parameters of the
picket line. Under Frisby, focused picketing occurs wherever picketing is primarily intended to invade residential privacy. Once the
definition of focused picketing is recognized as being broader than

201. The fact that some intent to communicate is inherent in each instance of picketing is not dispositive; the Frisby Court made clear that "even if some such picketers have
a broader communicative purpose, their activity nonetheless inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy." Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988).
202. See id at 488 (noting that Frisby was a facial challenge).
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the particular example offered in Frisby, courts may fashion injunctions barring this type of picketing consistent with the time,
place, and manner doctrine. These injunctions may be broader
than the ban specifically approved in Frisby and still meet the
narrow tailoring and ample alternative channels requirements as
long as they seek to do no more than remove that physical presence that is the evil of focused picketing and do not bar picketing
in other locations or other forms of communication that have not
been shown to invade residential privacy. Finally, the facts of the
residential picketing injunction cases reveal the need for some
model for determining when the balance that an injunction seeks
to establish has been tipped in favor of residential privacy rights.
Once picketers have had a fair opportunity to air their legitimate
grievances, little justification exists for allowing them to continue
to invade residential privacy. When the conduct becomes an end
in itself-merely a means of physical and psychological intimidation-it may be enjoined.
To those who remain unconvinced that First Amendment
rights must yield to residential privacy interests in these cases, it is
important to note that the absence of privacy may actually have a
greater chilling effect on freedom of speech than any speech regulation a legislature or court could impose. °3 Courts have long
recognized that to survive, democracy cannot be a free-for-all, that
"[t]o enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others
would be harsh and arbitrary in itself."'2' a As Justice Douglas observed,
Liberty... must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be
a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the
beginning of all freedom ....When we force people to listen to

203. Ruth Gavison, Too Early for a Requiem, 43 S.C. L. RiV. 437, 456 (1992) ("A
society without privacy ... likely will not enjoy much freedom or have robust individuals

who are willing to experiment, dare, and challenge their governments and the positive
morality of their societies.").
204. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); see also Consolidated Edison v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 546 (1980) (noting that "some forms of orderly regulation
actually promote freedom more than would a state of total anarchy."); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) ("The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of
an organized society maintaining public order, without which liberty itself would be lost
in the excesses of anarchy.").
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another's ideas, we give the propagandist a powerful weapon .... Once privacy is invaded, privacy is gone. 5

Without opportunities for quiet reflection and private self-examination, people cannot be expected to formulate informed opinions or
to adopt coherent positions from the vast array of opinions competing for their allegiance.
Those who would champion free speech rights therefore cannot automatically be assumed to prevail over those who seek to
protect other important freedoms. To do so threatens not only
other significant interests but free speech itself. Free speech is

without question an important and precious right, the cornerstone
of a free society. Yet no right exists to wrap oneself in the First
Amendment and "use it as an iron standard to smooth [one's]
path by crushing the living rights of others to privacy and repose. ' "6 In the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, might
does not necessarily make right." Freedom includes both the
right to speak one's mind and the right to make up one's mind
free from physical and psychological intimidation, and both of
these values are equally important aspects of true liberty."a

205. Public Utils. Comn'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467, 469 (1952) (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
206. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951).
207. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 124 (1969) (Black, J.,concurring)
(stating that to deny government the power to regulate conduct such as picketing "would
subject all the people of the Nation to the uncontrollable whim and arrogance of speakers, and writers, and protesters, and grievance bearers"). The marketplace of ideas would
be greatly impoverished if it were to operate solely on the squeaky wheel principle.
If subjecting one's family and neighbors to the harassment of demonstrations
and picketing is the price a private citizen must pay for expressing his views
then surely we will lose the one pervading thought which our founding fathers
have conveyed to us-that of fostering the free and open exchange of ideas. A
silent majority is enough. We should not become a country where only the
most boisterous voices are heard.
Walinsky v. Kennedy, 404 N.Y.S.2d 491, 498 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
208. See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 86 ("The right to speak one's mind would often be an
empty privilege in a place and at a time beyond the protecting hand of the guardians of
public order."). In fact, the two values are inextricably intertwined.
[F]reedom of expression is so important because of its relationship to the kind
of individuals that we want to have and the kind of society in which we want
to live. In order to have that very society, we need more than freedom of
speech. We need other forms of freedoms, virtues, and aspirations. Privacy is
not merely another important value that occasionally conflicts with free expression. Privacy is essential, in different ways, to the very same goals that we seek
to pursue through freedom of expression.
Gavison, supra note 203, at 460 (footnote omitted).

